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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court unwittingly spawned the so-called “Mobile-Sierra
doctrine” in 1956 with its two same-day decisions in United Gas Pipe
Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp.1 and Federal Power Commission
v. Sierra Pacific Power Co.2 The doctrine creates an important
restriction on the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC)3
ability to interfere with wholesale energy rates set forth in private
contracts. It does this by triggering a heightened standard of review that
applies when the Commission reviews fixed rates in private contracts;
specifically, the doctrine shifts the standard from the default “just and
reasonable” standard to a more rigorous “public interest” version. This
special modification attempts to balance the parties’ freedom of contract
with the Commission’s statutory obligation to ensure just and reasonable
rates for consumers. For over 50 years, the doctrine has been a bedrock
principle of private contract rights in the energy industry. But two
recent interpretations of the doctrine by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court are likely to significantly
impact its scope in the future.
In the summer of 2008, in Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v.
Public Utility District Number 1,4 the Supreme Court addressed the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine for the first time since its decisions in the two
cases from whence the doctrine sprang over 50 years ago. In addition to
officially enshrining the doctrine in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,
it interpreted its applicability in a way that may have expanded its reach
beyond what was previously acknowledged. Morgan Stanley held that
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine applies before and regardless of whether
FERC conducts a plenary review of a contract rate and despite the
presence of abnormal market conditions, thus fixing the doctrine’s
trigger point at the time of contract formation.5 Just shy of three months
earlier, in Maine Public Utilities Commission v. FERC, 6 the D.C. Circuit
confronted the novel question of whether the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
applied to challenges brought by third parties not privy to the contract.

1. 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
2. 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
3. This Article uses the terms Commission and FERC interchangeably to refer to
the agency and all of its post-Federal Power Act embodiments.
4. 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008) [hereinafter Morgan Stanley]. Although the Court
acknowledged that it has “seemingly blessed” certain tenets of the doctrine, id. at 273940, it also confirmed that it has never utilized the language “Mobile-Sierra doctrine” in
its opinions prior to this decision, id. at 2749 n.6.
5. Id. at 2746-48.
6. 520 F.3d 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008), reh’g denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24022
(D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2050 (2009).
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It held that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine did not apply to such non-parties
and could not be used to subject them to a more demanding burden of
proof as it does the contract principals because the contract cannot serve
to bind non-parties.7
These two interpretations about the doctrine’s scope may conflict.
While some contend that the Supreme Court’s holding effectively
overrules the Maine case, others maintain that the two cases are
distinguishable because of the different types of contracts each case
involved; the contract in Maine involved a multi-party settlement
agreement while the contract in Morgan Stanley was a standard supply
agreement.8 Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit itself denied FERC’s petition
for rehearing in light of Morgan Stanley on this point; however, it did
not explain why.9
Accordingly, the basic question presented here is whether a non-party
challenge to a contract rate is still exempt from the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine under Maine after the Morgan Stanley decision. The answer
may have serious ramifications for a range of potential litigants,
including fledgling energy outfits trying to make inroads into the
competitive and monopolistic markets of this industry, state ratemaking
authorities that might find their last vestiges of regulatory power over

7. Id. at 478.
8. Compare Richard P. Bress et al., A Deal Is Still a Deal: Morgan Stanley Capital
Group v. Public Utility District No. 1, 2007-2008 SUP. CT. REV. 285, 308 (2009)
(arguing that Morgan Stanley “requires use of the public interest standard for third-party
challenges”) and Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Termination of
Rulemaking Proceeding, 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,310 (2008) (repealing rulemaking to set a
default standard of review in all jurisdictional agreements, considering the matter settled
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan Stanley ) with Petition of Respondent FERC
for Panel Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n
v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 06-1403) (per curiam), reh’g denied, 2008
U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2050 (2009), and
Nev. Power Co., 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,312, para. 28 n.63 (2008) (responding to the Nevada
Attorney General’s argument that challenges brought by Nevada Consumer Protection
Department are not subject to Mobile-Sierra presumption as too premature to address).
Some of the debate centers on whether the Maine and Morgan Stanley holdings apply
separately to the different “types” of agreements that were present in those cases—specifically,
that Maine applies to settlement agreements and that Morgan Stanley applies to wholesale
power agreements. See, e.g., Coral Power, L.L.C., 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,176 (2008)
(Wellinghoff, Comm’r and Kelly, Comm’r, concurring in part) (distinguishing
Maine and Morgan Stanley along the lines of the types of agreements involved therein).
9. See Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v.
FERC, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 06-1403) (per curiam).
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interstate deliveries conclusively preempted, and consumer groups that
advocate on behalf of the paying masses for fair and equitable rates.
Part II of this Article provides a brief background of the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine, explaining its basic tenets, its effect on the standard of review
in Commission proceedings, how it comes to be triggered, and how it
applies. Part III sets forth the interpretations provided by Morgan
Stanley and Maine and explains the ramifications these holdings may
have on non-party challenges to contract rates. Part IV analyzes the
significance of the Supreme Court’s characterization of the MobileSierra doctrine as representing a “presumption” about the contract rate.
The Article concludes by speculating about the effects of Morgan
Stanley and Maine decisions on the doctrine’s application going forward.
It also lays out a policy argument favoring non-party exemption from the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine. The addendum provides a brief discussion of
the current appeal of the Maine case to the Supreme Court, the
arguments of the parties therein, and an explanation of why this Article’s
arguments are unique.
II. THE MOBILE-SIERRA DOCTRINE
A. Origins and Purpose10
Wholesale energy rates are typically set in one of two ways. The
supplier can either set rates unilaterally by selling energy based on
predetermined tariffs or can set rates bilaterally by contracting with
individual buyers and fixing the rate in the terms of their agreement.11
The Federal Power Act (FPA) charges FERC with ensuring that all rates
are fair and reasonable and provides FERC with the power pursuant to
this duty to review and approve tariff rates before they go into effect and
to override privately negotiated rates at any time.12 Regulated utilities
are required to file all eligible rate schedules, as well as any documents
affecting those rates, with the Commission.13 Any rate that is found not
10. This synopsis of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is only intended as a brief overview of
the doctrine’s basic tenets. For a more complete discussion of the origins, cases, and
evolution of the doctrine, see generally Carmen L. Gentile, The Mobile-Sierra Rule: It’s
Illustrious Past and Uncertain Future, 21 ENERGY L.J. 353 (2000).
11. See Morgan Stanley , 128 S. Ct 2733, 2737-38 (2008).
12. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d-e (2006). See also Boston Edison Co.
v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2000) (“In regulating electricity rates, the [FPA]
follows . . . a well-developed model: the utility sets the rates in the first instance, subject
to a basic statutory obligation that rates be just and reasonable . . . . [FERC] can
investigate newly filed rate, or an existing rate, and, if the rate is inconsistent with the
statutory standard, order a change in the rate to make it conform to that standard.”).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c). Under § 824d, regulated utilities are required to keep on
file with the Commission “schedules showing all rates and charges for any transmission
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be “just and reasonable,” grants “undue preference or advantage,” or
creates “undue prejudice or disadvantage” is unlawful and must be
corrected.14 The Commission, acting sua sponte or upon complaint, is
authorized to temporarily suspend any new rates, pending hearings to
evaluate whether they meet these criteria.15 If any rate fails review—i.e.,
it is found to be “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or
preferential”—the Commission can replace it with a rate that it
determines will satisfy the criteria—i.e., one that is “just and
reasonable.”16 Taken together, this establishes the framework of justand-reasonable review––the standard that the Commission must apply
when considering challenges brought against filed rates under sections
205 and 206 of the FPA.17 This framework and obligation operates at all
times over the background policy at the heart of the FPA: consumer
protection.18
The Mobile-Sierra doctrine limits FERC’s power to adjust rates in the
context of rates fixed by a contract, as opposed to rates fixed by the
Commission in the traditional tariff manner based on a fair rate of
return.19 As previously mentioned, the doctrine is the genesis of two
Supreme Court cases decided on the same day in 1956—Mobile and
Sierra—and derives its name from the Circuit Courts’ shorthand
reference to the rule that the two decisions created.20
In Mobile, the Court explained that the Commission’s review power
exists to ensure the lawfulness of rates fixed by a company, rather than
or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . together with all contracts which
in any manner affect or relate to such rates [and] charges.” Id. The FPA gives FERC
jurisdiction to regulate wholesale energy rates except the rates charged by local utilities
to their customers. Id. §§ 824(a), (b)(1).
14. Id. §§ 824d(a)-(b), (e).
15. Id. § 824d(e).
16. Id. § 824e(a) (“Whenever the Commission . . . upon its own motion or upon
complaint, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification . . . or that any rule, regulation,
practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable,
or unduly discriminatory or preferential . . . [it] shall determine the just and reasonable
rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed
and in force, and shall fix the same by order.”).
17. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 306 F.3d 1112, 1118 (D.C. Cir 2002); Boston,
233 F.3d at 66.
18. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County Wash. v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053,
1058 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 2733 (2008) [hereinafter
Snohomish].
19. Boston, 233 F.3d at 65.
20. Snohomish, 471 F.3d at 1057 n.3; Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. FERC, 210 F.3d
403, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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by the Commission.21 While the Act preserves companies’ powers to
contract and set rates no differently than they would in absence of the
Act, “the contracts remain fully subject to the paramount power of the
Commission to modify them when necessary in the public interest.”22
In Sierra, the Court expanded on this new public-interest standard
articulated in Mobile.23 It explained that in order for a party to prevail
on a unilateral request to increase a contract rate under this publicinterest standard, it must show that the rate is “so low as to adversely
affect the public interest––as where it might impair the financial ability
of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers an
excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.”24 As a result, a rate that
yielded a less-than-fair rate of return––sufficient grounds for revision
under the traditional rate-setting model––would no longer justify
invocation of the Commission’s revisionary powers.
In its most narrow sense, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine establishes the
rule that a party’s unilateral request for a revision of a contract rate with
another party may only proceed if the existing rate is such that it
adversely affects the public interest. This creates the so-called “public
interest” standard of review that applies in proceedings of this type. The
public-interest standard permits a rate revision if the petitioning party
can show that the existing rate: (1) impairs the financial ability of the
public utility to continue its service, (2) casts an excessive burden upon
other consumers, or (3) is unduly discriminatory.25 The rule’s rationale
is that a mutually agreed-upon rate should not be deemed “unjust” or
“unreasonable” simply because it turns out to be unprofitable for one of
the parties who agreed to it in the first place.26 The rule’s policy is to
“preserve the integrity of contracts [and] permit[] the stability of supply
arrangements . . . [that] is essential to the health of the . . . industry.”27
Therefore, the doctrine both prevents a regulated party from (mis)using
the Commission’s power in order to relieve itself of its own

21. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 341
(1956). In Mobile, the Court held that “[t]he scope and purpose of the Commission’s
review power [is] to determine whether the rate fixed by the . . . company is lawful.” Id.
While the FPA preserves the power of companies to “make rates and contracts” no
differently than if they would in absence of the FPA, “the contracts remain fully subject
to the paramount power of the Commission to modify them when necessary in the public
interest.” Id. at 343-44.
22. Id. at 344.
23. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 354-55.
27. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 380.
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“improvident bargain”28 and preserves the other party’s bargained-for
benefit.29 For this reason, a petitioner has a heavy burden to overcome
before the Commission will intervene to adjust a contractually set rate.
In sum, the doctrine exists to prevent contract parties from
manipulating the Commission’s power for their own ends and to restrain
the Commission from exercising its own power unjustly. It seeks to
balance private contractual rights with the Commission’s regulatory
mission to protect the consuming public by subordinating the statutory
revision mechanism to the cannons of contract law.30 As such, the
parties’ contract comes to govern the legality of the rate and defines the
rights of buyer and seller, up to the point where the public interest
demands otherwise.
B. The Just-and-Reasonable & Public-Interest Standards
While at least one court has called the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
“refreshingly simple,”31 its application has actually been fraught with
ambiguity over the years, particularly regarding the different meanings
and requirements of the just-and-reasonable and public-interest
standards. As the First Circuit described in attempting to distinguish the
standards, “Admittedly, the rates are too high for the period in question
to be just and reasonable . . . but are they so high as to be contrary to the
public interest—and what would this mean anyway? Very little useful
precedent exists . . . .”32 While the precise threshold dividing the two
standards remains elusive, we can ascertain in at least broad strokes the
major substantive difference between them.

28. Sierra, 350 U.S. at 355 (noting that “the purpose of the power given to the
Commission by § 206(a) is the protection of the public interest, as distinguished from the
private interests of the utilities . . . “).
29. Town of Norwood v. FERC, 587 F.2d 1306, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
30. Ne. Utilities Serv. Co. v. FERC (Northeast II), 55 F.3d 686, 689 (1st Cir. 1995)
(“[T]he Mobile-Sierra doctrine . . . represents the Supreme Court’s attempt to strike a
balance between private contractual rights and the regulatory power to modify contracts
when necessary to protect the public interest.”); Borough of Lansdale v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 494 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (explaining that the purpose of the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine is to “subordinate the [revision] mechanism to the broad and
familiar dictates of contract law” and, thus, “[t]he contract between the parties
governs the legality of the rate”).
31. Borough of Lansdale, 494 F.2d at 1113.
32. Boston Edison Co., v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted).
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It is important to first realize that the public-interest standard of
review created by Mobile and Sierra is technically no legally different
from the statutory just-and-reasonable standard.33 While the term
“public interest” does not appear anywhere in FERC’s authorizing
statute, apparently having been conjured by the Supreme Court,34 and
while the two standards are confusingly referred to as “the two modes of
review,” the public-interest standard is really just a special application of
the statutory just-and-reasonable standard that applies in the context of
contract rates.35 The public-interest standard is ostensibly only a
contextual tweak to the statutory standard of review for challenges of a
particular nature, not an “obviously indefensible” modification of the
statute itself.36 But while the two standards are theoretically one-andthe-same, substantively, the special public-interest and plain just-andreasonable standards entail very different burdens of proof.
Both standards leave considerable room for interpretation and involve
fact-intensive inquiries.37 Both have been the subject of confusion and
varying application.38 Without speculating on the specific facts that
would be needed to prevail under each standard, it suffices to say that
the public-interest standard poses a much higher burden of proof than
the plain just-and-reasonable standard.39 In the past, the burden created
by the public-interest standard has even been described as “practically
insurmountable,” rendering the possibility of future rate modification
“virtually meaningless.” 40 As the Supreme Court explained, the
33. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2743 (2008) (agreeing with the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation on this point).
34. Boston, 233 F.3d at 65.
35. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. at 2740.
36. Id. at 2743.
37. See Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. at 2747, 2750 (agreeing with Ninth Circuit that
the “three [Sierra] factors are in any event not the exclusive components of the public
interest” in all contexts); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968)
(“[A]dministrative authorities must be permitted . . . to adapt their rules and policies to the
demands of changing circumstances.”).
38. See, e.g., Snohomish, 471 F.3d 1053, 1060 n.8, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting
a “zone of reasonableness” test in a high-rate challenge); Transmission Access Policy
Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 708-13 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming FERC’s
adoption of specialized “generic public interest findings” in orders imposing open
access); Northeast II, 55 F.3d 686, 690-91 (1st Cir. 1995) (adopting a broader definition
of the public interest in high-rate challenge reflects “whose ox is gored”); Kansas Cities
v. FERC, 723 F.2d 82, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (recognizing that “many courts and regulatory
agencies confuse the concepts of just and reasonable rates and nondiscriminatory rates”);
see also, e.g., Boston, 233 F.3d at 64-65.
39. Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Northeast II,
55 F.3d at 691.
40. Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(explaining that the possibility of future rate change is virtually meaningless unless it
envisions a just and reasonable standard); accord Kansas Cities, 723 F.2d at 87-88 (“To
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regulatory system “contemplates abrogation of these agreements only in
circumstances of unequivocal public necessity.”41 In this vein, the D.C.
Circuit offered an illustrative juxtaposition:
[In promulgating a rule,] FERC’s rulemaking authority requires only that it point to
a generic public interest in favor of a proposed rule; the public interest necessary
to override a private contract, however, is significantly more particularized and
requires analysis of the manner in which the contract harms the public interest and of
the extent to which abrogation or reformation mitigates the contract’s deleterious
effect.
. . . [M]ore is required to justify regulatory intervention in a private contract
than a simple reference to the policies served by a particular rule.42

C. Triggering the Rule
As previously explained, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine applies to
wholesale rates fixed by contract. However, the contract parties still
have control over whether and to what extent it will apply to their
particular agreement. According to the D.C. Circuit in Papago, contract
parties can specify in their contract the standard of review that will
govern subsequent review of any rates contained therein.43 Under
Papago, parties have three options to choose from: the statutory justand-reasonable standard, the public-interest standard, or a hybrid
arrangement that adopts the public-interest standard for the parties but
preserves for the Commission the right to review under the just-andreasonable standard.44 Regardless of which approach the parties choose,
the rate can always be challenged under the public-interest standard,
since as the court explained:

assume that a contractual provision pertaining to rate adjustment refers to [the public
interest] standard is to assume that it was intended to be virtually inoperative . . . .”).
41. Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 822 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (citing
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956)), quoted in
Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct at 2748.
42. Texaco Inc. v. FERC, 148 F.3d 1091, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
43. Papago, 723 F.2d at 953.
44. Id. Under the first option, the parties must obtain a preliminary approval from
the Commission that the rate is just and reasonable, after which subsequent revisions are
also considered under the just and reasonable standard. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 824d (2006). The third method is also known as a “Memphis Clause,” named for the
case that first explained its operation. See generally United Gas Pipe Line Co. v.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S. 103, 110-113 (1958).
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The Commission’s obligation to insure that rates do not violate [the public interest]
is imposed for the direct benefit of the public at large rather than (like the
prescription of just and reasonable rates) for the direct benefit of the seller and
purchaser; and it therefore cannot be waived or eliminated by agreement of the
latter.45

If the parties are remiss to specify an arrangement, the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine governs the rate by default. As the First Circuit explained, it is
the common understanding of those “bargaining in the shadow of the
doctrine” that their contracts will be governed by the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine unless there is a specific arrangement otherwise.46 Therefore, it
is reasonable to assume that, absent language to the contrary, “the
specification of a rate or formula by itself implicates Mobile-Sierra.”47
As this illustrates, the contract principals have far reaching ability to
insulate their contract rate against future challenges, but this discretion is
not without limits. In Northeast I and Northeast II, the First Circuit
examined how the Mobile-Sierra doctrine applies to FERC when it
intervenes sua sponte to adjust a contract rate.48 The underlying contract
contained a provision that attempted to restrict any subsequent review to
the public-interest standard, regardless of whether it was initiated by the
contract parties or the Commission.49 The Commission refuted the
provision’s applicability to the Commission itself, arguing that the
principals could neither abrogate a third party’s right nor the
Commission’s duty to review rates under the just-and-reasonable
standard and that, even if they could, it could nonetheless use a more
45. Papago, 723 F.2d at 954.
46. Boston Edison Co., v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2000). Drawing in part
on Papago, the court stated, “In 1972, as today, the parties could negate the protection
afforded by Mobile-Sierra by providing that a contract rate initially fixed by the parties
and filed with FERC could be overridden by FERC at any time under the just and
reasonable standard.” Id. (citing Memphis Light, 358 U.S. at 112; Papago, 723 F.2d at
953; Kansas Cities v. FERC, 723 F.2d 82, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
47. Id. at 67 (citing Texaco Inc., 148 F.3d at 1096; Appalachian Power Co. v. Fed.
Power Comm’n, 529 F.2d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976)) (emphasis added); accord
Appalachian Power, 529 F.2d at 348.
48. See generally Northeast II, 55 F.3d 686 (1st Cir. 1995); Ne. Utilities Serv. Co.
v. FERC (Northeast I), 993 F.2d 937 (1st Cir. 1993).
49. Ne. Utilities Serv. Co., 50 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,266, 61,838 (1990). The condition
provided that:
Further, Seller [North Atlantic], Buyer [PSNH] and [the State of New Hampshire]
shall not, and each hereby waives (to the extent it may lawfully do so) any
right it may have to, file a complaint with respect to the rates charged under
this Agreement pursuant to Section 206 of the Federal Power Act and the
Rules and Regulations of the FERC promulgated thereunder without
the prior written consent of each of the others, and each further agrees
that in any proceeding by the FERC under Section 206 the FERC shall not
change the rate charged under this Agreement unless such rate is found to be
contrary to the public interest.”
Id. (citation omitted).
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flexible version of the public-interest standard than the “practically
insurmountable” one described in Papago.50
On appeal, the First Circuit gave mixed responses to these arguments.
On one hand, in Northeast I, it disagreed with the Commission that the
parties could not bind it to the public-interest standard of review,
explaining that the Commission is obligated to “respect certain private
contract rights in the exercise of its regulatory powers,” including the
right to fix a more rigorous standard of review.51 Thus, Mobile-Sierra
protects the right of the parties to stipulate which type of review they
want—just-and-reasonable or the more demanding public-interest
standard—by which the Commission must abide.52 On the other hand,
in Northeast II, it mostly agreed with the Commission that even if the
public-interest standard applied, it would be a more flexible version than
the “practically insurmountable” one described in Papago.53 It affirmed
that the Commission has discretion to determine what circumstances
implicate the public interest and that the Sierra factors did not comprise
an exhaustive list in that regard.54 The particular application of the
public-interest standard and its focus of concern “all depends on whose
ox is gored and how the public interest is affected.”55 To that end, the
Commission has the most authority to read additional protections into
the public-interest standard when it acts to protect third-party interests
adversely affected by the contract terms.56
III. THE SHOWDOWN
A. The Morgan Stanley Interpretation
In Morgan Stanley, the Supreme Court sought to clarify at which point
in time the Mobile-Sierra doctrine begins to apply to a contract rate.
Specifically, the court examined whether the doctrine applies prior to

50. Id. at paras. 61,838-39; Ne. Utilities Serv. Co, 66 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,332, 62,076
(1994) (order on remand from Northeast I).
51. Northeast I, 993 F.2d. at 960. The court did not address the non-party issue
raised by FERC, id. at 961-62, possibly because the challenge was not brought by a true
outside party but, rather, by FERC acting sua sponte, id.
52. Id. at 961.
53. Northeast II, 55 F.3d at 689; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text
(discussing Sierra factors).
54. Id. at 689-90.
55. Id. at 691.
56. Id. (citing Northeast I, 993 F.2d at 961).
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FERC reviewing a rate for the first time. 57 The case involved a
consolidated appeal of several FERC orders involving requests to
modify rates set forth in contracts created during the Western Energy
Crisis of 2000-2001.58 In the administrative hearings, FERC determined
that under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the modifications were not
warranted because the parties failed to meet the burden of proof
demanded by the public-interest standard.59 The petitioners appealed to
the Ninth Circuit, claiming that the Commission had incorrectly applied
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine in considering their requests.60
One of the petitioners’ central arguments, and the key issue presented
to the Ninth Circuit, was that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine did not apply
unless the Commission first had the opportunity for initial review prior
to the rate going into effect.61 The Ninth Circuit agreed. It reasoned that
the application of Mobile-Sierra depended on “the regulatory context in
which the contracts were initially formed” and whether it “provide[s] a
sound basis to believe that the resulting rates are just and reasonable.”62
Assuring that this basis exists requires both “timely and procedurally
effective review of rates . . . and [] meaningful substantive standards for
review of the circumstances of contract formation.”63 The first element
cannot be satisfied unless the Commission has the initial “opportunity
for plenary, ‘just and reasonable’ agency review.”64 The second element
cannot be satisfied unless it can be shown that the contract negotiations
57. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. at 2737.
58. Snohomish, 471 F.3d at 1067. The contracts at issue were for future supplies
of energy from the wholesale energy market, which is regulated by FERC. Id. at 1056-57.
59. See Nev. Power Co., 103 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61353, para. 111 (2003), reh’g denied,
Nev. Power Co, 105 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61185 (2003).
60. Snohomish, 471 F.3d at 1056-57.
61. Id. at 1057. The rates in issue were subject to FERC’s market-based rate
authorization. Id. at 1061. Under this mechanism, which is a result of the recent policy
reforms to facilitate open access, a utility is authorized to charge whatever rate the
market will bear, so long at the utility itself first meets certain structural and marketpower criteria. Id. at 1065. This contrasts the cost-based rate mechanism whereby FERC
approves a rate, should it choose to investigate it, that would allow the utility a fair rate
of return while protecting ratepayers from exploitation. Id. at 1063. The key difference
is how the rate is effectuated. In the latter mechanism, a rate becomes effective only
after it has been filed with FERC and approved. Id. at 1060. In the former mechanism,
the rate is effective immediately, so long as the utility maintains its market-based rate
authorization from FERC, which is subject to re-verification. Id. at 1060, 1065.
62. Id. at 1075.
63. Id. at 1075-76. In the context of a market-based rate mechanism, see supra
note 61, the court found that an initial market-based rate authorization could only qualify
as sufficient prior review when “accompanied by effective oversight permitting timely
reconsideration of [the] authorization if market conditions change.” Id. at 1080. It
concluded that FERC’s monitoring and compliance mechanism fell short in this regard,
and, therefore, invoking the Mobile-Sierra doctrine had the effect of FERC “abdicat[ing]
its statutory responsibility . . . .” Id. at 1084.
64. Id. at 1077.
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took place in a “functional marketplace;” otherwise, there can be no
assurance that the rates are just and reasonable or that the policies
underlying the Mobile-Sierra doctrine will be respected.65 The Ninth
Circuit found that FERC had failed to examine either of these
preconditions and remanded the case for reconsideration.66
The Supreme Court rejected outright this interpretation of the
doctrine, which it said had misportrayed the rule as a form of estoppel on
the Commission.67 The Court explained that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
provides the exclusive test of “what it means for a rate to satisfy the justand-reasonable standard in the contract context . . . regardless of when
the contract is reviewed.”68 The theory of the doctrine is “grounded in
the commonsense notion that ‘[i]n wholesale markets, the party charging
the rate and the party charged [are] often sophisticated businesses
enjoying presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected
to negotiate a “just and reasonable” rate as between the two of them.’”69
And under it, “the ordinary mode for evaluating contractually set rates is
to look to whether the rates seriously harm the public interest, not to
whether they are unfair to one of the parties that voluntarily assented to
the contract.”70 The Court also disagreed with the Ninth Circuit that
application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine required a preliminary finding
on underlying market conditions.71 It reasoned that to require so would
create a “perverse rule” that would undermine contract reliability in
volatile markets despite any public-interest issues and reduce incentives
to contract during turbulent markets in the future.72 The Court noted,
however, that the Commission could still set aside a contract, given
evidence of misconduct at the formation stage, such as fraud, duress, bad
faith, or other traditional affirmative defenses, or if there is evidence of
illegal market manipulation by one of the parties, the existence of which
would rebut the basis for the presumption about the contract rate.73

65. Id.
66. Id. at 1085, 1090.
67. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2737, 2746 (2008).
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 476 (2002))
(alterations in original).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2746-47.
73. Id. at 2747.
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B. The Maine Exception
In March 2008, the D.C. Circuit confronted the question of whether
the Commission could approve a clause in a settlement agreement,
stipulating that any subsequent challenges brought by non-contracting
third parties must be reviewed under the “the highly-deferential ‘public
interest’ standard.”74 The court answered this question in the negative.75
The contract in question, “a comprehensive settlement agreement that
had the effect of redesigning New England’s capacity market,”76
contained a clause specifying that the public-interest standard would
apply to all future requests to modify its terms regardless of who brought
the proposal forward—a party, non-party, or FERC.77 In the first appeal
to the D.C. Circuit, the Commission rejected the notion that it legally
could be bound by the clause.78 However, it subsequently approved the

74. Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464, 477 (2008) (per curiam),
reh’g denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct.
2050 (2009).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 467. In a capacity market “‘the [transmission provider] compensates the
generator for the option of buying a specified quantity of power irrespective of whether it
ultimate buys the electricity.” Maine, 520 F.3d at 467 (alteration in original) (quoting
Keyspan-Ravenswood, LLC v. FERC, 474 F.3d 804, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).
Transmission providers often use this as “spinning” power to deal with fluctuations in
demand. See id. The problem was that the market was so poorly functioning that the
“supply of capacity was barely sufficient to meet the region’s demand,” so the utilities
were at risk of violating reliability criteria. Id. (citing Devon Power LLC, 115 F.E.R.C.
¶ 61,340, para. 63 (2006)). To address this problem, demand–supply generators sought
to enter into “‘Reliability Must-Run’ agreements” with the New England Independent
System Operator (ISO) in order to recover their full cost of service and remain in
operation despite their financial challenges. Id. at 467-68. However, these types of
contracts have the effect of hindering entrance and competition in the market. See id. at
468 (quoting Devon Power LLC, 103 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,082, para. 29 (2003)). In an attempt
to deal with this problem, FERC approved a limited version of the generators’ initial
proposal and directed the ISO to “develop a new market mechanism” that would ensure
that “prices would be highest in the regions with the most severe capacity shortages,
which would encourage new entry.” Id. (citing Devon Power LLC, 103
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,082, paras. 31-32 (2003)). In response, the ISO introduced a “demand
curve” that was used to set pricing, which proved to be highly controversial. Id. (citing
Devon Power LLC, 107 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,240, paras. 10, 38, 53 (2004)). After months of
negotiations, a settlement was reached, the key feature of which was the creation of the
Forward Capacity Market, which eliminated need for a demand curve. Id. at 469 (citing
Devon Power LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,340, paras. 15-16 (2006)). However, eight parties
opposed the settlement. Id. (citing Devon Power LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,340, para. 15
(2006)). The settlement also set up a “transition payments” system to facilitate the
Forward Market through a series of fixed payments to be paid to the generators during
the transition period—a feature that was highly contentious. Id. (Devon Power LLC, 115
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,340, paras. 30-31 (2006)).
77. Id. (quoting Devon Power LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,340, para. 172 (2006)).
78. Me Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 454 F.3d 278, 280, 283-84 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
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clause, reasoning that the “use of the more deferential [public-interest]
standard in a limited number of circumstances would promote ‘rate
stability.’”79 The petitioners, various entities that were not parties to the
settlement, disputed the provision arguing that it would deprive them of
their statutory right to challenge rates under the just-and-reasonable
standard.80 The Court of Appeals agreed with this argument, holding
that the non-parties could not be held to a provision in a contract to
which they were not parties and that their challenge could not thereby be
subjected to the public-interest standard of review.81 It explained that
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is only meant to guarantee stability “as
between the contracting parties.”82 It does not apply to non-contracting
party challenges since that would abrogate FERC’s statutory duty to
review such challenges under the just-and-reasonable standard.83 Thus,
it held that the Commission’s acceptance of the clause imposing a
stricter standard was unlawful.84 The court explained:
The Mobile-Sierra doctrine carves out an exception to [the just-and-reasonable
standard] based on the “familiar dictates of contract law.” When two or more
parties reach a negotiated settlement over a disputed rate, FERC applies a strong
presumption that the settled rate is just and reasonable, and the Commission
may only set aside the contract for the most compelling reasons. The purpose of
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is to “preserve the benefits of the parties’ bargain as
reflected in the contract, assuming that there was no reason to question what
transpired at the contract formation stage.”
Courts have rarely mentioned the Mobile-Sierra doctrine without reiterating
that it is premised on the existence of a voluntary contract between the parties . . . .
Similarly this Court has emphasized that the deferential public-interest standard
only applies to “freely negotiated private contracts that set firm rates or establish a
specific methodology for setting the rates for service.”85

From this, the court went on to hold that “Mobile-Sierra is invoked
when ‘one party to a rate contract on file with FERC attempts to effect a
unilateral rate change by asking FERC to relieve its obligations under a

79. Maine, 520 F.3d at 470 (citing Devon Power LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,340,
paras. 183-86 (2006)).
80. See id. at 467.
81. See id. at 478.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 470.
85. Id. at 477 (citations omitted).
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contract whose terms are no longer favorable to that party.’”86 The
Commission disputed this conclusion, reiterating that the public-interest
standard would only be applied to a “narrow category” of challenges,87
and that furthermore, it still leaves the Commission with “significant
authority to protect non-parties to the settlement from harm” and
adequately safeguard third-party interests.88 The court rejected both of
these arguments because, in its view, adoption of either would still result
in “ depriv[ing]” or “derogat[ing]” the non-settling parties’ statutory
right to a just-and-reasonable standard of review.89 In conclusion, the
court summarized:
[T]he Mobile-Sierra doctrine is designed to ensure contract stability as between
the contracting parties—i.e., to make it more difficult for either party to shirk its
contractual obligations. It makes no sense to say that the values of “stability”
and “certainty” are furthered by applying the deferential standard of review to
the eight parties that refused to agree to the terms of the settlement.90

C. The Conflict
The conflict between Morgan Stanley and Maine may not be readily
apparent unless one appreciates the dimensions of the questions resolved
by the opinions. In Morgan Stanley, the Court dealt with the timing and
triggering of the Mobile-Sierra rule.91 The Court determined that the
rule applied at the time of contract formation and regardless of
preliminary agency review because the doctrine stands for the
“presumption” that rates established by sophisticated parties who
bargain at arm’s length are per se just and reasonable.92 Thus, the
only substantive prerequisite to applying the rule is that the contract
was formed through arm’s-length bargaining absent circumstances that
would lead one to doubt the fairness of the agreement at the outset.93
This holding raises an important question, which is at the heart of this
Article, that implicates the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Maine: namely,
since Morgan Stanley held that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine applies from
the time of contract formation, does a non-party then automatically lose
the “statutory right” recognized in Maine to challenge the rates under the
86. Id. at 478 (quoting Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 454 F.3d 280, 284
(D.C. Cir. 2006)). The court also noted, “It goes without saying that a contract cannot
bind a nonparty.” Id. (quoting EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002)).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 478 n.9 (citing Devon Power LLC, 115 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,340, para. 184
(2006).
89. Id. at 478 & n.9.
90. Id. at 479 (citation omitted).
91. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2737 (2008).
92. Id. at 2745-46.
93. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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just-and-reasonable standard by virtue of the contract’s existence?
Answering this question requires further inquiry into the contours of the
Court’s “presumption” language, the substantive effect that a presumption
would have on a non-party’s challenge, and whether a far-reaching
presumption can be squared with the goals of the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine.94
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRESUMPTION CHARACTERIZATION
Throughout the Morgan Stanley opinon, the Supreme Court refers to
the doctrine as the “Mobile-Sierra presumption,” insofar as it creates a
legal presumption about the rate in the underlying contract.95 Prior to
the D.C. Circuit’s reference in Union Electric Co. v. FERC to MobileSierra, the doctrine was never directly tied to the word “presumption” in
this way.96 Interestingly, it was not so referenced again until the Ninth
Circuit’s usage in the cases leading up to the Morgan Stanley appeal.97
Before these appearances, the Courts of Appeal commonly referred to
doctrine as triggering a “standard of review.”98 The Commission also
seemed to understand it as such.99 The ultimate question regarding the
change in terminology is whether it makes a substantive difference.
Does rebutting a presumption require something different than satisfying
a standard of review, and how might this affect non-party challenges?
94. A common reaction, shared by at least two FERC Commissioners, is that the
cases are distinguishable in terms of what “types” of contract they each are applicable to.
See supra note 8. While this is a plausible reconciliation of the two cases, it is by no
means conclusive. The D.C. Circuit never implied that it meant for its holding in Maine
to be limited only to cases involving settlement agreements, utilized broad language in
its reasoning, and interpreted the same fundamental principles as the Supreme Court did
in coming to its conclusion in Morgan Stanley. Considering this, it is at least as
plausible that the D.C. Circuit did not intend its opinion to be limited along “type-ofcontract” lines. Furthermore, if it would be unfair to hold parties that were involved in
the contract negotiations to the public-interest standard, how would it then be fair to
apply the standard to parties who were not involved at all, but may also be affected by
the contract’s terms? Such a proposition would be difficult to construct.
95. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley , 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2735 (2008).
96. 890 F.2d 1193, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
97. See Snohomish, 471 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006); Pub. Utilities Comm’n v.
FERC, 474 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 2006).
98. See, e.g., Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464, 470, 478 (D.C.
Cir. 2008), reh’g denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
129 S. Ct. 2050 (2009); Wisc. Pub. Power, Inc. v. FERC, 493 F.3d 239, 254 (D.C. Cir.
2007); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. FERC, 210 F.3d 403, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Northeast II, 55 F.3d 686, 692 (1st Cir. 1995).
99. See, e.g., Ne. Utilities Serv. Co., 66 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,332, 62076 (1994).
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Although perhaps one of the most slippery legal terms of art,
presumptions are most simply characterized as assumptions about the
meaning of a certain basic fact that allow or require the fact-finder to
reach a certain pre-ordained conclusion when that triggering fact is
present.100 They serve as an evidentiary short cut, substituting for proof
of certain intermediary details that would otherwise be required in order
to establish the inference sought. A standard of review embodies
assumptions about the level of deference that should be given in
evaluating the outcome of a prior adjudicative process and also defines
the scope of relevant materials that may be examined during the
inquiry.101 With questions of fact, a presumption seeks to establish
criteria for evaluating the validity of the fact-finder’s conclusion based
on the facts she had available to consider.
The important difference between these two devices is the methods
and means required to prevail under each of them. To overcome a
presumption, one must effectively challenge the validity of the
presumptive fact itself, not the basic fact upon which it is premised.102
In the present circumstance, the basic fact is that the parties had a
contract, and the presumptive fact, or conclusion drawn, is that the rate
is just and reasonable. Thus, it follows from the very creation of the
contract itself that the rate therein is presumed just and reasonable.
According to the Supreme Court, in order to attack the presumptive fact,
one must show that the rate is not just and reasonable by either
demonstrating the existence of a contract defense or absence of arm’slength bargaining.103 If such infirmities exist at the contract formation

100. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342, at 495-96 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed.
2006).
101. See STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF
REVIEW § 1.01 (3d ed. 1999). Strictly speaking, a standard of review is “[t]he criterion
by which an appellate court exercising appellate jurisdiction measures the constitutionality of
a statute or the propriety of an order, finding, or a judgment entered by a lower court.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). This is not a particularly accurate definition
of the way the Mobile-Sierra doctrine has been thought to function as a standard of
review since in such cases there is no statute or lower court under evaluation, only the
parties’ contract. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2737 (2008). In reality, the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine is actually a substantive standard used for evaluation of the facts
in the first instance. Under it, the Commission is not so much testing the parties’
decision-making process as it is the outcome of the process. To help preserve the
analogy it may be useful to think of it as representing two related notions: (1) the criteria,
or test, created for evaluating whether or not the rate is just and reasonable and (2) the
requirement that FERC “affirm” or “defer to” any rate that meets those criteria. In this
way, the rate is like a statute and the just-and-reasonable standard is like the
Constitution or alternatively, the rate is like a jury verdict and the just and reasonable
standard is the level of deference afforded that judgment.
102. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 100, § 344, at 506-07.
103. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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stage, then the rate cannot be assumed just and reasonable and the
presumption disappears.104 To satisfy a standard of review in a factual
context, one must show that the basic facts presented, when taken as a
whole, could justify the conclusion sought. Applying this to the justand-reasonable standard of review, one must show that the basic facts as
a whole could reasonably support the conclusion that the rate is “unjust,
unreasonable, discriminatory, or unduly preferential.”105
One key operative difference creates the critical substantive disparity
between these two devices: the type of factual evidence one must present
to prevail.106 A presumption dramatically constricts the ambit of relevant
evidence that can be introduced until the presumption is effectively
rebutted. Without the presumption, the standard of review would permit
a much broader range of relevant evidence to be considered initially and
in the final conclusion. To rebut a “Mobile-Sierra presumption,” one
must produce circumstantial evidence about the contracting parties’
incentives and negotiations—details that the presumption itself conceals.
Such “intra-contractual” evidence is only likely to be available to the
parties themselves, and obtaining it would pose significant challenges to
outsiders. In contrast, to satisfy the standard of review, a non-party
could introduce a variety of “extra-contractual” evidence concerning the
detrimental outcomes and effects of the contract rate on consumers.
Introduction of the parties’ contract into evidence would trigger the
operation of the presumption, which would recreate the issue of
104. The effect of successfully rebutting a presumption is actually a topic of
substantial debate. Known as the “Bursting Bubble” theory, it has its proponents and
detractors. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 100, § 344(A). While exploration
of this debate is beyond the scope of this Article, it suffices to say that if a challenger
brings forth the type of proof the Supreme Court indentified in Morgan Stanley, see
supra note 73 and accompanying text, the presumption ceases to operate for purposes of
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.
105. This wording embodies the statutory allocation of the burden of proof on the
Commission or complainant under section 205 of the FPA. Federal Power Act, 16
U.S.C. §824e(b) (2006).
106. Imagine a basic case of appellate review of a jury trial. If some presumption
present in the trial required the jury to return a certain verdict, the reviewing court would
ask, “What was the conclusion the jury was required to draw? Is the presumption
rebuttable? If so, what must be shown to rebut it? Did the opposing party present such
evidence?” In contrast, if the court were reviewing a jury verdict rendered without the
mandate of a presumption, under the applicable standard of review the reviewing court
would ask, “What was the evidence the jury had to consider? What is the verdict the
jury drew? Was the verdict supported by the weight of the evidence considering the
applicable burden of proof?” The scope of potentially relevant evidence is very different
in these two situations.
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accessing relevant evidence already discussed. If, by virtue of the
contract being made, the conclusion automatically follows that the rate is
just and reasonable, it basically forecloses any real possibility that a nonparty could mount a successful challenge. The kind of circumstantial
evidence needed to rebut the presumption would probably only be
available to the parties themselves and could only be uncovered, if at all,
through expensive and time-consuming discovery. The problem is that
Congress stated that one need only show that a rate is “unjust,
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential,” but the Supreme
Court now requires a threshold showing of something more. Though it
might be fair to apply this kind of heightened proof to parties who have
affirmatively, or abstractly, indicated that they think the rate is just and
reasonable under some sort of waiver theory, or to those otherwise
responsible for creating the presumption, it is questionable whether it
would be fair to abrogate the statutory rights of non-parties in the same
fashion. For either the party or the non-party to rebut the Mobile-Sierra
presumption, it would have to show that the proper incentives did not
exist at the time of the contract formation—i.e., the absence of arm’slength bargaining. For this, it would have its arsenal of traditional
contract defenses for unfair dealing—fraud, duress, etc.—as well as the
option of proving that “market dysfunction” is caused by “illegal action
by one of the parties.”107 However, as the dissent in Morgan Stanley
points out, “By including contracts within the scope of [section]
206(a) . . . Congress must have concluded that the contract defenses are
insufficient to protect the public interest.”108 The dissent also noted that
“the fact that the FPA tolerates contracts does not make it subservient to
[them].”109 The Maine court also seems to have been aware of this
alternate avenue of redress but obviously thought that it required a
different solution.110
Another argument in favor of the presumption understanding is based
on the idea that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is not really a standard of
review at all. Representing this view are a small number of courts that
have referenced the Mobile-Sierra doctrine in conjunction with a
“burden of proof,” recognizing the substantive change to the level of
107. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2747 (2008); see supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
108. Id. at 2758 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. See Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(“The purpose of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is to ‘preserve the benefits of the parties’
bargain as reflected in the contract, assuming that there was no reason to question what
transpired at the contract formation stage.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Atlantic City.
Elec. Co. v. F.E.R.C., 295 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2002)), reh’g denied, 2008 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2050 (2009).
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evidence required to prevail;111 even though, in this context, those courts
probably are more specifically referring to the burden of production.112
Nonetheless, doctrinally, a standard of review and a burden of proof are
not the same thing.113 Regardless of the persuasion/production distinction,
the Morgan Stanley presumption language is still problematic under this
alternate reading of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. A presumption operates
to shift the burden of production, and perhaps the burden of persuasion,
on the party that it operates against.114 As Professor McCormick points
out:
Assignments of the burdens of proof prior to trial are not based on presumptions.
Before trial no evidence has been introduced from which other facts are to be
inferred. The assignment [of the burden of proof] is made on the basis of a rule
of substantive law providing that one party or the other ought to have one or
both of the burdens with regard to an issue.115

The Supreme Court agreed that the burden of proof is indeed defined
by the substantive law governing the case—i.e., the statute.116 As
previously noted, the statute in this context—the FPA—creates a burden
of proof that obligates a challenger to show that the rate is “unjust,
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential.” If the MobileSierra doctrine in fact creates a legal presumption that effectively
modifies the burden of proof prior to trial, it would alter the rights of all
challengers under the statute, effectively subjugating the entire clause of
the statute to the filing mechanism at the sole discretion of private
parties.117

111. Texaco Inc. v. FERC, 148 F.3d 1091, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1998); City of Frankfort
v. FERC, 678 F.2d 699, 705 n.9 (7th. Cir. 1982); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Fed. Power
Comm’n, 557 F.2d 227, 229 (10th. Cir. 1977).
112. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 330 (1986); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (burden of production).
113. See Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.9 (11th Cir. 2004).
114. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 100, § 343, at 500.
115. Id. § 342, at 499.
116. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 55 (2005).
117. At least two justices think this is exactly what is going on. In his dissent,
Justice Stevens points out that even though the Court claims the presumption does not
supplant, but is merely a “‘differing application” of the statutory just and reasonable
standard, in reality “[t]here is no significant difference between requiring a heightened showing
to overcome an otherwise conclusive presumption and imposing a heightened standard
of review.” Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2733, 2752 (2008) (Stevens J., dissenting). This,
he believes, is the Court doing exactly what it said was “‘obviously indefensible’” in
applying what is in effect a separate standard of review through the presumption. Id.
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Of course, it is not as if the statutory standard of review disappears
entirely under a Mobile-Sierra presumption. Rather, it is just repackaged as the public-interest standard the same way as always. From
this, one might argue that even though the Supreme Court has elucidated
a new evidentiary route to remove the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, one can
still challenge the rate under the public-interest standard using all matter
of extra-contractual circumstantial evidence—that, in effect, any
disparity created by the presumption is immaterial. The obvious
response to this is that even if the public-interest standard preserves the
relevance of extra-contractual evidence, it still poses a much higher
evidentiary burden than the naked just-and-reasonable standard and is
just as, if not more, substantively different.
V. CONCLUSION
A. The Post-Morgan Stanley Landscape
Although a clear answer to the question originally presented may not
be possible at this point, several observations from the foregoing may be
helpful in at least discerning guiding principles that may help resolve the
dispute.
If the words of the Morgan Stanley Court are taken at face value and
if the Mobile-Sierra doctrine does signify a far-reaching
presumption about the contract rate, it seems clear that, in effect, the
Supreme Court has redefined what initially qualifies as relevant
evidence. The conflict here is that Congress explicitly set forth the
burden of proof and evidentiary requirements in the statute. Even if the
presumption was not strictly a legal one, operating only to shift the
burden of proof during trial once the contract is introduced into
evidence, one has to ask what relevance the contract would have to a
party who had nothing to do with its making. If the contract embodies
the thoughts and agreements of the signatory parties, of what relevance
is this to an outside party challenging the soundness of that judgment?
To allow a biased contract to stand for evidence of good judgment when
an outside party seeks to challenge the very judgment that produced the
contract is a circular conundrum. Unless used to impeach the argument
of one of its principals to the contrary, the contract itself provides little
probative value to test the allegation that it was poorly conceived in the
first place.
The Morgan Stanley Court did not address whether, by using the word
“presumption,” it intended to go as far as altering the rights of nonparties. Although the repeated use of the construction may suggest an
intent to drive that very point home, it is undercut by the Court’s core
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rational for assuming the presumption applies—”‘the party charging the
rate and the party charged [are] often sophisticated businesses, enjoying
presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected to
negotiate a “just and reasonable” rate as between the two of them.’”118
This suggests that the Court only had the contracting parties in mind
when considering how the presumption would operate.119 To parse the
phrase even further, the presumption may even be borne from the phrase
“presumptively equal bargaining power,” which would obviously be
nonsensical when applied to parties outside of the negotiations. The idea
that the Court would likewise endorse such a robust, far-reaching
presumption that would not just simply affect the contract principals but
substantively alter rights of non-participatory third parties outright is
doubtful considering the Court’s position that such an interpretation
would be “obviously indefensible.”120
Perhaps the most important question is whether these inferences are
enough to displace the direct and clear words of the D.C. Circuit that the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine is binding only “as between the contracting
parties.”121 The Maine court even embraced the idea that Mobile-Sierra
creates a presumption, a “strong presumption” that negotiations will
produce a “settled rate [that] is just and reasonable, [that] the
Commission may only set aside . . . for the most compelling reasons.”122
Nonetheless, it still concluded that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine exists to
“preserve the benefits of the parties’ bargain” and is limited to parties
sharing a voluntary contract.123
Absent explicit language in Morgan Stanley to rebut the clear
assertion of Maine and the grant of the FPA, any inference made from

118. Morgan Stanley, 128 S. Ct. 2737, 2746 (2008) (quoting Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 476 (2002)) (alteration in original).
119. Consider also the Court’s statement that “[in] evaluating contractually sets
rates [the ordinary mode] is to look to whether the rates seriously harm the public
interest, not whether they are unfair to one of the parties that voluntarily assented to the
contract,” id., which seems to imply the Court’s primary concern is with preventing
“parties that voluntarily assented to the contract,” id., from escaping their liabilities for
anything less than a very good reason. But does that also mean those who did not
voluntarily assent to the contract could challenge it as unfair or unreasonable?
120. Id. at 2740.
121. Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464, 479 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
reh’g denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct.
2050 (2009).
122. Id. at 477.
123. Id.
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the “presumption” language will have to be strong enough not only to
displace the D.C. Circuit’s clear and narrow analysis of the precise issue
but also to rebut the statutory presumption that non-parties retain a right
to use the unabridged just-and-reasonable standard in the interest of
consumer protection. By the analysis here, it doesn’t seem like such an
outcome is likely.
Assuming then that the Court meant to establish a more limited
presumption, applicable primarily to the contract principals, then
application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine will depend on two considerations:
the source of the challenge and the independence of the challenger’s
interests from those of the contract principals. Essentially, how and if
the rule will apply depends on who initiates the challenge. As the Maine
court observed, the doctrine exists to protect the interests of the parties
as between themselves and perhaps against FERC as well, should it
decide to intervene.124 If one of the principals or the Commission itself
brings the challenge, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine most likely applies
since the principals are entitled and expect to prospectively insulate their
bargain from further interference from these sources, as established in
Papago.125 But if the Commission merely acts as a forum for a challenge
by an outside party, the doctrine is probably out of place because those
interests never had a say in determining the level of protection that the
agreement deserves. This accords with the position of the Maine court
that the doctrine is not designed to protect the interests of total outsider
non-parties; rather, it is the statute that provides these protections.126 As
the Northeast II court observed, the primary consideration in adapting
the public-interest standard for atypical circumstances is determining
who stands to lose out under the contract.127 If a contracting party loses
out, it should be solely accountable for its own mistake, and the
Commission should not intervene short of what is necessary to prevent
extraordinary harm to third parties that might flow from the contract.
But if the contract directly harms outside parties, the Commission must
be given the right to intervene with broader discretion under a more

124. See supra Part I(C).
125. Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
126. Maine, 520 F.3d at 478. Of course, this seems at odds with the Papago court’s
statement that the backstop public interest standard, not the just and reasonable standard,
exists to protect external parties. Papago, 723 F.2d 950, 953 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Whether
or not this is a correct appraisal of the FPA’s intent, the Maine court might respond that,
although such a position is certainly supportable when the challenge is brought by one of
the contract principals, a different treatment is still justified when outside interests bring
a challenge on their own accord.
127. See supra Part I(C).
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relaxed standard of review to protect those unrepresented interests.128
This again supports the notion that outsider interests deserve different
treatment than insider ones when questioning the justness and
reasonableness of a contract rate.129
Together these understandings of the doctrine’s application appear to
establish a trend. Under this trend, the Commission is afforded minimum
discretion to alter the rate when one of the principals asks it to do so,
intermediate discretion when it acts on its own accord to protect the
generalized public interest, and maximum discretion when it acts
pursuant to a third-party challenge and seeks to vindicate a particularized
interest or grievance. In this last circumstance, perhaps FERC’s
discretion extends so far as to review under the unabridged just-andreasonable standard. Adapting this trend to presumption terminology, if
the negotiations establish the presumption that the rate is just and
reasonable, then that presumption runs most strongly against the contract
principals, less strongly against FERC, and perhaps least strongly—if
that, according to Maine—against non-parties.
B. What is the Best Policy?
The patterns explained fit with the sometimes-conflicting goals
emphasized by both the FPA and the Mobile-Sierra doctrine: respectively,

128. See Northeast II, 55 F.3d 686, 690-91 (1st Cir. 1995). Under the rationale of
Northeast I and Northeast II, this relaxation of the “practically insurmountable” public
interest standard is justified because in these circumstances FERC has supposedly identified
some genuine problem with the rate. See id. at 691. Thus, the concern that the contract
parties are just attempting to use the Commission’s powers to bail them out of their own
bad deal is not present.
129. Another interesting feature in this vein is that both the statute and the Sierra
factors mention undue discrimination as one of the considerations in determining whether a
rate is lawful. See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b) (2006); Fed. Power Comm’n
v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 353 (1956). The position shared by the
Commission and the Papago court regarding undue discrimination is that its focus
changes in each context depending on who bears the brunt of the discrimination. See
Papago, 723 F.2d at 953 n.4. Under the statutory mode of review, the Commission may
consider if one of the parties to the contract is the recipient of undue discrimination and
modify the contract accordingly. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a). However, under Mobile-Sierra
review, the parties are deemed to have waived that protection and, provided that the
externalities do not surpass a certain threshold, the analysis of undue discrimination
comes to focus solely on those who are “not parties to the contract.” Papago, 723 F.2d
at 953 & n.4. The interesting feature in this is that while the parties to the contract lose
their statutory protections, non-parties do not and arguably become the chief concern as
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine takes over. See id.
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consumer protection and contract stability. The contract concerns
underlying the doctrine and the consumer protection concerns at the
heart of the FPA will most likely be aligned in a functioning market with
proper incentives but may be discordant in situations where those
conditions are absent. The pattern attempts to strike a balance between
contract stability and consumer protection, depending on the parties and
the interests in play.
According to the Morgan Stanley Court, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
allows greater freedom of contract, which is important to supporting the
role of contracts in the FPA’s statutory scheme.130 It held that “[t]he
FPA recognizes that contract stability ultimately benefits consumers,
even if short-term rates for a subset of the public might be high by
historical standards—which is why it permits rates to be set by contract
and not just by tariff.”131 To this end, it reasoned that “the FPA intended
to reserve the Commission’s contract-abrogation power for those
extraordinary circumstances where the public will be severely harmed.”132
This assertion accords with all the cases previously discussed and with
the Maine court’s observation that the doctrine recognizes “the superior
efficiency of private bargaining[] and . . . subordinate[s] the statutory
filing mechanism to the broad and familiar dictates of contract law.”133
However, the Maine court doubted that applying the public-interest
standard of review to non-parties would further “stability” and
“certainty.”134
These concerns are as old as the doctrine itself.135 Strong arguments
can and have been made for assuring certainty and stability in order to
encourage future bargaining between sophisticated parties. But it is
another question how these concerns are manifested in regard to nonparties. Assuming the non-party brings forth a valid concern—that it is
not merely serving as a proxy for one of the contract principals—it must
have some independent interest significant enough to motivate it to
130. Morgan Stanley , 128 S. Ct. 2737, 2739, 2747 (2008).
131. Id, at 2749.
132. Id.
133. Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. FERC, 520 F.3d 464, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Borough of Lansdale v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 494 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1974)), reh’g denied, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 24022 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129
S. Ct. 2050 (2009).
134. See id. at 479. The court held specifically that “[i]t makes no sense” to apply the
public interest standard “to the eight parties that refused to agree to the terms of the
settlement.” Id. While this would seem to limit the court’s assertion to circumstances where
the non-parties previously objected to the terms, the broad language used by the court leading
up the conclusion, which discusses non-parties in general terms, probably negates this
inference. See id. at 478-79.
135. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 322, 344,
380 (1956).
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undertake the costs of litigation that was not considered by the parties
who created the agreement. Such non-parties could consist of organized
consumer groups or other similar state-sponsored consumer protection
authorities, whose members would ultimately bear the costs of the
contracting parties’ bad bargain.136 State public utilities commissions
(PUCs) that are responsible for setting tariffs to provide a reasonable
rate of return or new and struggling competitors protesting unjust rates
could also fit this bill.
One might say that such hypothetical parties are still protected by the
ever-present public-interest standard, which by its very name implies
that it is designed to safeguard these groups’ interests. The problem, of
course, is that the public-interest standard is still extremely onerous such
that the concerns of the affected group, while valid in their own right,
may not rise to the level that the standard demands. Moreover, state
ratemaking agencies are already significantly restrained under the “filed
rate doctrine” (FRD) from exercising regulatory authority over FERCapproved interstate rates. The FRD requires that “interstate power rates
filed with or fixed by FERC must be given binding effect by state
utilities commissions determining intrastate rates” as a matter of federal
supremacy under the Constitution.137 The FRD, handed down by the
Supreme Court in Nantahala Power and Light Co. v. Thornburg,138
prohibits any second-guessing or modification for any reason by the
state agency of the federally approved wholesale rate as to not upset
Congress’s unified and plenary federal scheme of regulation.139 Thus,
all state regulatory agencies are required to pass through any and all
charges that FERC deems to be just and reasonable to the retail rates
charged to end-use customers.140 While a full discussion of Nantahala
and market-based rate authority is beyond the scope of this Article, it
suffices to say that state utility agencies don’t have many tools at their
disposal to protect their populace from exploitative or otherwise
imprudent rates charged by interstate energy providers. Taking away
what is essentially their only way to effectively challenge a federal rate
determination would leave state regulatory agencies charged with
consumer protection with little choice but to make due regardless of
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See, e.g., Nev. Power Co., 125 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,312, para. 30 n.63 (2008).
23A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 56:431 (West 2009).
476 U.S. 953 (1986).
Id. at 967.
Id. at 969-72.
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rate’s unfairness applied to their jurisdiction. While the Court in
Nantahala expressly discussed the topic of federal preemption, there is
no similar consideration found in Morgan Stanley, which again calls into
question whether the Mobile-Sierra doctrine can be inferred to extend to
non-party challenges.141
One might also argue that the interests of public groups are already
adequately protected under the existing anti-trust laws. However, antitrust laws existed at the time Congress passed the FPA, and by including
explicit provisions governing proof for the causes of action created
therein, perhaps it thought something more was required in this special
context.142 Of course, to ensure that the exception would not swallow
the rule, FERC would have to closely screen these hypothetical parties’
claims in order to uncover any conflicts, determine whether a claim is
genuine, and discern under which standard of review it rightfully
belongs. Even if the contract principals are forced to defend their
agreement against a non-party, they should have nothing to fear so long
as the rate is just and reasonable, as it should be.
With respect to the public groups’ concerns, it is doubtful whether a
far-reaching Mobile-Sierra presumption would engender the right
incentives vis-à-vis the FPA’s goal of consumer protection or provide
appropriate deference to the Commission in carrying out its regulatory
mission. As recent experience bears out, the bad decisions made by
blue-chip megaliths are often borne by the average joe.143 In some
sense, the Commission exists as a forum, sometimes the only forum, that
the public can use to enter into the fray and represent its interests in the
costs of this indispensable resource. Absent market choices, it may
indeed be the only venue by which they can hope to influence their own
bottom lines. By insulating the contracting parties from all but the most

141. See generally Steven Ferrey, Sustainable Energy, Environmental Policy, and
States’ Rights: Discerning the Energy Future Through the Eye of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 507 (2000) (discussing in greater detail national energy
policy and federal preemption of state authority in the area).
142. The “filed-rate doctrine” creates other complications and obstacles in pursing
this avenue of relief as well. See generally Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield:
Judicial Enforcement for the Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591 (2003).
143. The reference here is to the recent financial crisis and resulting recession/
depression brought on by unregulated mortgage-backed securities and their
related derivatives. While during their heyday such instruments created windfall profits
which translated into exorbitant Wall Street salaries and bonuses, in the aftermath of
their decline it is the average citizen that is left to live with and clean up the rubble from
the collapse. As millions of citizens lose their jobs they are simultaneously being asked
to foot the bill to save the very companies that invented the maelstrom in order to avoid
further ruin for all. It is these sorts of disproportionate benefits and burdens that justify
close and scrutinizing regulation of companies wielding such huge market and economic
influence, a trait that is not unique to financial conglomerates.
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extraordinary challenges, it would allow them to effectively subvert the
statute’s mechanism providing for rate challenges initiated by a
complaint. While the goals of “stability” and “certainty” are no doubt
valuable, it is not to say that they will be jeopardized by placing
additional incentives on parties to negotiate contracts, bearing in mind
the interests of their captive customers under threat of just-andreasonable review upon complaint. Arguably, even if FERC acting sua
sponte is limited to the public-interest standard, the possibility that
contracted rates would be subject to ratepayer attack under the just-andreasonable standard would encourage utilities to achieve rates that best
respect the public interest in the just-and-reasonable sense of the word.
Considering the monopolistic status of many players in the energy
industry and the so-far failed efforts at deregulation, such a scepter,
could be a useful check on consumer exploitation.
The question of “best policy” may actually be beside the point insofar
as the law is concerned, since technically it’s the Commission and not
the judiciary that should be trusted with these types of decisions in both
setting the policy and determining how to apply it.144 However, a
discussion of administrative deference in this area is beyond the scope of
this Article. Whatever the entity charged with casting the final word on
the matter is, it is important to realize that contract stability and consumer
protection will occupy the same space sometimes and other times refuse
to coalesce. This supports the notion that non-parties should not be bound
by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine because one can’t count on the contracting
parties to act in the best interests of non-parties, absent incentives to do
so. In reality, investor-owned utility buyers cannot be counted on to
look out for the interests of end-use customers. Giving state PUCs and
consumer groups the ability to counterbalance such inequities in
representation at the contract stage with the threat of just-and-reasonable
review, absent the restrictions of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, could
provide the necessary incentive. At the end of the day, the policy
argument over whether and how the Mobile-Sierra doctrine should apply
must center on which choice better serves the interests of the consuming
public in the long run: contract stability or consumer protection.
144. See generally SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (holding that it is
within the discretion of the agency to determine how to proceed in creating a new policy
or regulation especially in complex regulatory schemes); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that any agency’s reasonable
interpretation of its own statute should be allowed to stand).
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VI. ADDENDUM
The Supreme Court granted the Maine case certiorari on April 27,
2009.145 The case was argued November 3, 2009, shortly before this
Article went to print.146 The briefs of both the petitioners and respondents
and the oral arguments focused on two issues: (1) whether the Maine
court’s holding even applied to contract rates or to only those set by
tariff and (2) whether allowing non-parties to challenge a contract rate
under a more lenient standard of review than FERC or the contract
principals was the best way to further the doctrine’s goal of contract
certainty and stability.147 While this Article also touches on these issues,
it raises another important consideration not addressed by the parties:
namely, whether establishing a legal presumption based on the MobileSierra doctrine would effectively override the burden of proof specified
by Congress in the FPA. This precise question was not presented in the
appeal, so resolution of this issue may have to wait for another day. As
such, this line of inquiry is likely to retain its vitality after the Court’s
decision, within both this particular realm of jurisprudence and perhaps
beyond.

145. NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 129 S. Ct. 2050 (2009)
(mem.), argued Transcript of Oral Argument, NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub.
Utilities Comm’n, 2009 WL 3612508 (Nov. 3, 2009).
146. Transcript of Oral Argument, NRG Power Mktg., 2009 WL 3612508 (Nov. 3,
2009).
147. See generally id.; Brief for Petitioners, NRG Power Mktg., 2009 WL 1994752
(July 7, 2009); Brief for Respondents, NRG Power Mktg., 2009 WL 2896320 (Sept. 4,
2009).
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